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Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century:
A Critical Reassessment of the Shareholder
Primacy Model
CAROL LIAO*

This article questions the efficiency of the shareholder
primacy model of corporate governance in light of
the financial calamities that have plagued the first
decade of the 21st century. Reform efforts following
the global financial crisis have focused on failures in
securities regulation, but that is only part of the story.
Effective reform measures must also address the legal
and normative prescriptions found within existing
governance structures, and the collateral effect those
prescriptions have on political and regulatory inaction.
There was strong ideological support for the
shareholder primacy model at the start of the century.
Following the corporate and accounting scandals of
2001 and 2002, three scholarly perspectives emerged
addressing the effectiveness of the model.This article
continues the dialogue on those perspectives and
examines two factors that contributed to the collapse
of the US subprime mortgage market: the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act and the originate-to-distribute
model of lending. The examination reveals how the
shareholder primacy model played a key role in the
onslaught of the global financial crisis by incentivizing
the obstruction of efficient regulation. Alongside this
analysis is an interwoven account of the evolution of
law and economics scholarship. The article provides
a timely outlook on how the shareholder primacy
model encourages corporate behaviour that perpetuates the likelihood of future crises. It concludes by
offering potential solutions for reform.

*

Dans cet article, on s’interroge sur l’efficacité du
modèle de la primauté des actionnaires dans le cadre
de la gouvernance d’entreprise à la lumière des
désastres financiers qui ont marqué la première décennie du 21e siècle. Les projets de réforme qui ont
suivi la crise financière mondiale se sont concentrés
sur les lacunes de la règlementation des valeurs mobilières, mais ce n’est là qu’une partie du problème. Si
l’on veut que les mesures de réforme aient une réelle
efficacité, il faut également s’attaquer aux prescriptions juridiques et normatives que l’on retrouve
dans les structures de gouvernance existantes et
l’incidence collatérale que ces prescriptions ont sur
l’inaction en matière politique et réglementaire.
Le modèle de la primauté des actionnaires
a bénéficié d’un fort appui idéologique au début
du siècle. Dans la foulée des scandales financiers
et comptables de 2001 et 2002, trois perspectives
savantes se sont penchées sur la question de l’efficacité de ce modèle. L’auteur de cet article poursuit
le dialogue amorcé par ces différentes perspectives
et analyse deux des facteurs ayant contribué à
l’effondrement du marché des prêts hypothécaires
américains à risque : l’abrogation de la Glass-Steagall
Act et le modèle d’octroi puis de cession du crédit.
Cette analyse permet de dégager la manière dont le
modèle de la primauté des actionnaires a joué un rôle
déterminant dans le déclenchement de la crise financière mondiale en incitant à l’obstruction d’une réglementation efficace. Elle s’accompagne d’un compte
rendu entrelacé de l’évolution de l’érudition en
matière de droit et d’économie. Cet article présente
une perspective tout à fait d’actualité sur la manière
dont le modèle de la primauté des actionnaires
encourage chez les entreprises un comportement
qui perpétue la probabilité de futures crises. Il conclut en offrant d’éventuelles solutions de réforme.
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Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century:
A Critical Reassessment of the Shareholder
Primacy Model
CAROL LIAO

I. INTRODUCTION
The financial calamities that have marked the first decade of the 21st century
indicate it is time to pose new challenges to the assumed efficiencies of the shareholder
primacy model of corporate governance. As the facts behind the global financial
crisis continue to unfold, reform efforts have focused on failures within securities
regulation—but that is only part of the story. While the shareholder primacy model
may be ideologically entrenched in the United States of America (US), the severity
of the crisis calls for a reassessment on the merits of this mainstream corporate
governance model.
It is important to recognize that the account in this article is based on US
sources, and addresses US-specific issues. The global financial crisis clearly affected
many other nations, among which the causes and timelines may differ. Part II of this
article looks back in time to the corporate and accounting scandals that immobilized
the US financial markets between 2001 and 2002. It first identifies the prevalent
support of the shareholder primacy model prior to the scandals, and then traces
three scholarly perspectives that emerged shortly thereafter.The first group of scholars
supported laissez-faire market principles and felt the demise of companies embroiled
in the scandals only evidenced that the market was working effectively. The second
group called for stricter market regulations to support the existing governance model.
The third group believed nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of corporate
governance practices was required, and pushed for deep normative and structural
reform. Within law and economics scholarship, the scandals marked a period when
behavioural approaches began to gain greater momentum and influence in the field.
Part III then delves into an analysis of some of the factors that contributed
to the collapse of the subprime mortgage market (recognized as the first in a series
of events that have come to define the global financial crisis): the repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act1 and subsequent development of large financial conglomerates
1

Banking Act of 1933, Pub L No 73-66, 48 Stat 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
USC). Also known as the Glass-Steagall Act [GSA].
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and “shadow banks;”2 and the development of the originate-to-distribute model of
lending in an unregulated over-the-counter derivatives market.The narrative behind
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act exposes how regulators can be intimately involved
with the corporate entities that they govern, and cannot be relied upon as sole
protectors of broader stakeholder interests. In the narrative behind the originate-todistribute model of lending, the competitive need to generate profit induced several
mortgage lending institutions to use questionable and even predatory lending tactics
on potential borrowers. The examination shows how intensive lobbying efforts by
interested corporate institutions essentially forced legislators to roll back antipredatory lending laws.
In Part IV, key scholarly perspectives that emerged in the aftermath of
the crisis are identified and incorporated into the three perspectives examined in
Part II to reveal how positions have changed since the scandals of 2001 and 2002.
The article highlights how the legal and ideological support of the shareholder
primacy model of governance has laid the groundwork for corporate behaviour
that heavily influences regulatory inaction and perpetuates the likelihood of future
crises. Part V concludes by offering elements from both old and new institutional
law and economics approaches as a starting point to recalibrate efficiencies within
the existing governance model, and then provides examples from emerging hybrid
corporate structures as potential solutions for reform.
Power and control issues among corporate actors, and the placement of
incentives that support existing power arrangements, are only amplified when
viewed from within an industry capable of impacting the economic health and wellbeing of so many. Several types of corporate and financial institutions played key roles
in the crisis. It was a large-scale event that involved a significant cast of characters:
banks, shadow banks, mortgage lending institutions, credit rating agencies and
trade and lobby groups, among others. The governance of financial institutions may
statutorily differ in many ways from that of large, public corporations, but there are
intricate and delicate commonalities found in the balancing of relationships between
the actors familiar to both types of institutions: directors, officers, shareholders and
other stakeholders. The events of the crisis highlight how similar norms pervade
the structural makeup of both corporate and financial institutions. The prescriptive
model that drives the ongoing development and application of corporate and
regulatory law is what matters. Reforming that model is the key to bringing about
lasting change to the way corporate and financial institutions conduct themselves
going forward.

2

Shadow banks can be defined as “financial institutions [such as mutual funds, investment banks and
hedge funds] that in some respects parallel banking activities but are subject to less regulation than
commercial banks.” Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2011) at 543, online: US Government Printing
Office <http://www.gpo.gov>.

Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century:

191

A Critical Reassessment of the Shareholder Primacy Model

II. LAW, ECONOMICS AND THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY MODEL
A. Shareholder Primacy at its Peak
In their well-known 2001 article “The End of History for Corporate Law,” Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argued that the basic law of corporate governance
had already achieved a high degree of uniformity to the shareholder primacy model and
that “continuing convergence toward [this] single, standard model is likely.”3 According
to Hansmann and Kraakman, some key normative principles in this consensus include:
1) ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the
shareholder class;
2) the managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders;
3) other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees,
suppliers, and customers [which, together with shareholders,
are included as “stakeholders”], should have their interests
protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than
through participation in corporate governance;
4) noncontrolling shareholders should receive strong protection
from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders; and
5) the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is
the principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.4
Arguing from an Anglo-American perspective, Hansmann and Kraakman
believed that alternative governance models (identified by them as manageroriented, labour-oriented and state-oriented) had already been tried and had failed.5
3
4

5

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89:2 Geo LJ
439 at 439.
Ibid at 440-41. There seems to be little contention in legal scholarship regarding Hansmann and
Kraakman’s definition of shareholder primacy. See e.g. Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance” (2003) 97:2 Nw UL Rev 547 at 573 (which describes two
principles of shareholder primacy: the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the principle of ultimate shareholder control); Jill E Fisch, “Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy” (2006) 31:3 J Corp L 637 (which asserts that shareholder primacy “defines the objective of
the corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth” at 637); Ian B Lee, “Efficiency and Ethics in the
Debate about Shareholder Primacy”(2006) 31:2 Del J Corp L 533 (which defines shareholder primacy
as “the view that managers’ fiduciary duties require them to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and
preclude them from giving independent consideration to the interests of other constituencies” at 535).
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 443-47. Hansmann and Kraakman describe the manager-oriented
model as one that existed between the 1930s and the 1960s in the US; the labour-oriented model as one
that peaked in Germany in the 1970s and caused the Commission of the European Communities to draft
the Amended Proposal for a Fifth Company Law Directive Founded on Article 54 (3) (G) of the Treaty Concerning the
Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of their Organs, [1983] OJ C240/2; and
the state-oriented model as one most extensively realized in France and Japan post-World War II. The
examination of these historical and international governance systems is beyond the scope of this article.
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Pointing to the shareholder primacy model’s assumed efficiencies and its historical
economic domination, they contended that the ideological convergence of this
model is unlikely to be undone, especially since “no important competitors to the
standard model of corporate governance remain persuasive ….”6 US confidence
in the shareholder primacy model was at its peak. To Hansmann and Kraakman,
the ideological convergence toward the model meant that general convergence in
practice would eventually follow—thus signifying, for all intents and purposes, an
end of history for corporate law.7
Economic efficiency was the main force behind Hansmann and Kraakman’s
presumption of the long-term international acceptance of shareholder primacy.
They identified profit maximization, historical success and international competitive
advantage as factors that “made the virtues of [the shareholder primacy] model
increasingly salient.”8 Their logic is in line with the beliefs held by scholars of
the Chicago School of law and economics, who have frequently used an AngloAmerican view of neoclassical economic theory and efficiency analysis to explain
and understand the development of law.
Scholars within the Chicago School generally accept and adhere to principles
that have been at the core of modern economics since Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,9 a work many Chicago scholars cite with
regularity.10 A defining characteristic of the Chicago School is its contention that
legal rules and outcomes can be assessed on the basis of their efficiencies.11 Richard
Posner, recognized as the foremost leading proponent of the Chicago School,12 was

6
7

8
9
10

11

12

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 454.
Ibid at 455. There is considerable discourse available on the issue of the global convergence of
corporate governance, both prior to and following Hansmann and Kraakman’s work. See e.g. John C
Coffee Jr, “The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
and its Implications” (1999) 93:3 Nw UL Rev 641; Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, eds, Convergence
and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 449.
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 7th ed, Eighteenth Century
Collections Online, (1776).
See Steven G Medema, “Adam Smith and the Chicago School” in Ross B Emmett, ed, The Elgar Companion to the Chicago School of Economics (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010) at 40 (where he states,
“[t]here is … no question that the Chicago School has both claimed and evidenced a close affinity with
Smith—directly or indirectly—for three-quarters of a century”).
See generally Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed (New York: Aspen, 2007) at 13
[Posner, Economic Analysis (7th ed)] (where despite a variety of measures surrounding the concept of
efficiency, Posner points out that the common operating definition in economics is “nine times of
out of ten” in reference to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, an outcome is
considered more efficient if the monetary value of society’s resources is maximized. If the marginal
willingness to pay by those who benefit from an action is equal to the marginal willingness to accept
payment by those harmed, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency contends that all parties end up no worse off than
before (assuming those harmed are paid directly or indirectly by those benefiting or their proxies).
See e.g. Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Postmodernism
and Beyond, 2d ed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 94 (which states, “[t]he work of
[Chicago School law and economics] scholars—of whom Posner as professor, scholar, and judge is
perhaps the foremost exponent—forms the core of the Chicago approach”).
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one of the first to advance the efficiency hypothesis in detail.13 The Chicago School’s
application of neoclassical economics to legal theory has meant that principles
surrounding rational maximizers who respond to price incentives are considered
when implementing and applying legal rules to market and non-market subjects.14
Applying the principles of neoclassical law and economics on a global market level,
one sees how the singular objective of a higher share price within the shareholder
primacy model (the “shareholder wealth maximization norm”15) is legitimized in
theory, providing a necessary “invisible hand” of self-interest to promote efficient
outcomes within the supply and demand of the free market.16
Using this measure in a corporate law context, the existing shareholder
primacy model can purport to be bolstered by neoclassical efficiency analysis.
Hansmann and Kraakman have pointed to the standard model’s many notable economic advantages, some of which they list as “access to equity capital at lower cost
(including, conspicuously, start-up capital), more aggressive development of new
product markets… and more rapid abandonment of inefficient investments.”17 The
common concerns surrounding efficiency and wealth maximization relate to agency
costs associated with divergent objectives between managers and shareholders.
While recognizing that “the problem of agency costs … limits the efficient
size of firms,”18 Posner has contended that, within the separation of ownership and
control, agency costs are generally contained. In his 1998 edition of Economic Analysis
of Law, Posner stated, “[m]ismanagement is not in the managers’ self-interest; it is
in fact very much contrary to their self-interest, as it will lead eventually to the
bankruptcy of the firm (and of the managers’ future employment prospects), as a
result of the competition of better managed rivals.”19 Agency costs relating to any
divergent interests in the manager-shareholder relationship will likely be addressed
through protective features within a company’s charter and bylaws, which Posner
believes “shareholders would normally insist upon….”20 Hansmann and Kraakman as
well state that the shareholder primacy model has “stronger incentives to reorganize
along lines that are managerially coherent….”21 In addition, norms analysis has
played a greater role in law and economics scholarship in recent decades. Janis Sarra
notes, “[l]aw and economics scholars have used norms analysis to explain particular

13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Other founding scholars of the Chicago School, notably Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi, Henry
Manne and Gary Becker, have also made significant contributions to the study of efficiency in law and
economics research. See e.g. ibid at 94-102.
Posner, Economic Analysis (7th ed), supra note 11 at 4.
See e.g. Bainbridge, supra note 4; Fisch, supra note 4; Lee, supra note 4 (for definitions of the concept).
Smith, supra note 9 (who famously stated: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer,
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” at 22).
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 450-51.
Posner, Economic Analysis (7th ed), supra note 11 at 420.
Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 5th ed (New York: Aspen, 1998) at 452. Note, however,
that the comment did not appear in the next edition.
Ibid.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3 at 451.
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corporate conduct that does not easily fit into the pure market-driven conception
of the corporation, suggesting that corporate officers… [are] influenced by norms
that bridge the gap between efficiency-enhancing activity and duties of care and
loyalty.”22
B. Three Perspectives Following the Corporate and Accounting Scandals of 2001
and 2002
Hansmann and Kraakman’s article was published in early 2001, prior to the fall of
Enron Corporation (Enron) and a number of other corporate and accounting scandals
that devastated the financial markets in the latter half of 2001 through to 2002.
Readers are advised to consult the extensive documentation and analysis of Enron’s
collapse that is available,23 but in brief, Enron’s bankruptcy resulted from unlawful
transgressions by its managers, which included non-transparent financial reporting,
mark-to-market accounting and the creation of complex corporate structures for
the sole purpose of concealing billions of dollars in debt.24 Once this information
was revealed to the public, the outrage expressed by investors, employees, pension
holders and politicians was palpable.25 Following in rapid succession after the fall of
Enron was a series of other corporate and accounting scandals that brought down
several other companies, including most notably WorldCom,26 whose bankruptcy
quickly replaced Enron’s as the largest in history.27 Its downfall was due in part

22

23

24

25
26
27

Janis Sarra, “Oversight, Hindsight, and Foresight: Canadian Corporate Governance through the
Lens of Global Capital Markets” in Janis Sarra, ed, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) 41 at 42. See e.g. Eric A Posner, “Law, Economics, and Inefficient
Norms” (1996) 144:5 U Pa L Rev 1697; Melvin A Eisenberg, “Corporate Law and Social Norms”
(1999) 99:5 Colum L Rev 1253 (for more on norms analysis).
Notable scholarly works are included in these footnotes. Enron’s collapse has also been retold in
non-fiction books and movies. See e.g. Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room:
The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (New York: Portfolio, 2004); Mimi Swartz with Sherron
Watkins, Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron (New York: Doubleday, 2003); Enron:
The Smartest Guys in the Room, DVD: (NewYork: Magnolia Pictures, 2005); Frontline: Bigger Than Enron,
2002, DVD (Boston, MA: WGBH, 2009).
See e.g. Douglas M Branson, “Enron—When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to
Corporate Governance Reform?” (2003) 48:4 Vill L Rev 989 at 997-1002 [Branson, “Systems Fail”]
(for a helpful summary).
See e.g. Kevin Anderson, “The Enron Outrage Game,” BBC News (26 February 2002), online: BBC
News <http://www.bbc.com>.
Other companies included Tyco International, Adelphia Communications, Peregrine Systems and
Global Crossing.
See Luisa Beltran, “WorldCom Files Largest Bankruptcy Ever,” CNN Money (22 July 2002), online:
CNN Money <http://www.money.cnn.com> (which reports WorldCom’s bankruptcy as the
largest in the history of the United States with $107 billion in assets, dwarfing that of Enron, which
listed $63.4 billion in assets when it filed for bankruptcy). At the time of writing, the WorldCom
bankruptcy is the third largest in history, after the bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers Holdings
($639 billion) and Washington Mutual ($328 billion). See also Research Center: Largest All-Time
Bankruptcies, 20 Largest Public Company Bankruptcy Filings 1980–Present, online: BankruptcyData.com,
<http://www.bankruptcydata.com>.
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to management falsely inflating revenues and under reporting costs.28 Following
Enron’s collapse, there came to be several discussions from legal scholars on the
appropriate governmental response to the scandals. Simon Deakin and Suzanne
Konzelmann’s short article entitled “Corporate Governance after Enron: An Age
of Enlightenment?”29 identifies three groups of opinion that developed after the
scandals. The following analysis summarizes Deakin and Konzelmann’s findings
and significantly builds upon them by highlighting some of the more persuasive
voices from legal scholarship at the time, and categorizing them within Deakin and
Konzelmann’s three groups.
The first group believed that Enron’s collapse only confirmed the existing
model was working and “might actually be a reason to be more confident about
corporate America.”30 Enron was an “aberration,” and an example of one bad
board did not denote that all boards were ineffective governance mechanisms.31
This group, echoing Adam Smith’s laissez-faire market principles, felt that “[m]arket
sanctions, in the form of reputational damage to its senior managerial team and
to its auditors…served as an effective disciplinary device.”32 William W. Bratton
described this group as “supporters of deregulation” who found Enron’s collapse
to be “an exemplar of free market success.”33 In this sense, “If Enron was a house of
cards, it was free market actors who blew it down, with a free market administration
keeping its hands off.”34 Once discovered by the public, the false inflation of Enron’s
stock price came to an end, and its value within the financial markets quickly
depreciated. Because of the swift market reactions to Enron’s exposed activities,
proponents of this first position believed there was little to be accomplished with
wider reforms to the existing corporate model. Enron’s bankruptcy, then, was a
“triumph of capitalism.”35

28

29

30
31
32
33
34
35

See Complaint (Securities Fraud), Securities and Exchange Commission v Worldcom, Inc, No 17588 (SDNY
2002), online: Securities and Exchange Commission <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
complr17588.htm> (which claims that WorldCom disguised its operating performance by using
undisclosed and improper accounting that overstated its income by approximately $3 billion in 2001
and $797 million during the first quarter of 2002).
Simon Deakin & Suzanne J Konzelmann, “Corporate Governance after Enron: An Age of Enlightenment?” in John Armour & Joseph A McCahery, eds, After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising
Securities Regulation in Europe and the US (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) at 155.
“Another Scandal, Another Scare,” The Economist (27 June 2002), online: The Economist <http://
www.economist.com>. See also Deakin & Konzelmann, supra note 29 at 155.
See Branson, “Systems Fail,” supra note 24. See also Douglas M Branson, “Enron is an Aberration,”
USA TODAY (1 March 2002) 9A.
Deakin & Konzelmann, supra note 29 at 155.
William W Bratton, “Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value” (2002) 76:5 & 6 Tul L Rev
1275 at 1281.
Ibid.
Robert L Borosage, “Enron Conservatives,” The Nation 274:4 (4 February 2002) 4, online: The
Nation <http://www.thenation.com> (noting that then-Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill called
Enron’s rise and fall a “triumph of capitalism” at 5).
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The second group acknowledged that both managerial and “gatekeeper”36
failures had occurred, and pushed for reform specifically addressing the misdeeds
of Enron’s executives and its lack of proper corporate monitoring. This group
focused on tightening securities regulation and improving the functioning of the
shareholder primacy model, without challenging or restructuring it. Governance
failures were traced back to conflicts of interest on the part of board members
and its auditors. Many pointed to the false comfort of an independent monitoring
board. On paper, Enron had a board that was ideal in several respects; among other
favourable qualities, the board was diverse, with only two of their 14 directors
classified as insiders.37 Corporate governance issues thus focused on maintaining
sufficient director independence and accountability, as well as a subtle shifting of
powers from managers back to shareholders. Leading the charge was the Council of
Institutional Investors (CII), an organization that in 2002 represented institutional
investors holding approximately $2 trillion in pension assets. This group provided
a detailed list of accounting and corporate governance reform recommendations
“to prevent future Enrons.”38
Many of the CII recommendations, along with other recommendations
from the second group, eventually coalesced and led to the creation of the SarbanesOxley Act of 200239 (SOX Act). The SOX Act was enacted directly in response to the
scandals and implemented several new rules and regulations to curtail unwanted
corporate behaviour. In particular, it contained provisions addressing director and
managerial accountability through financial disclosure, including the imposition
of a duty to disclose “on a rapid and current basis such additional information
concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer,
in plain English …;”40 greater internal controls, such as stricter standards on the
36

37

38

39
40

Gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to
investors.The term “gatekeeper” is not simply an academic concept. See U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 2000 SEC LEXIS
1389 (Securities Act Release No 7870 on 30 June 2000), at 5, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov>
(where the SEC noted, “[t]he federal … laws … make independent auditors ‘gatekeepers’ to the
public securities markets”).
Stuart L Gillan & John D Martin, “Financial Engineering, Corporate Governance, and the Collapse of
Enron” (2002) [unpublished, archived at the Social Science Research Network] online: Social Science
Research Network <http://ssrn.com>.
Council of Institutional Investors, Press Release, “SWIB Joins Council of Institutional Investors Seeking
Reforms to Prevent Future Enrons” (4 February 2002), online: State of Wisconsin Investment Board
<http://www.swib.state.wi.us>. The SWIB’s recommendations, which were largely adopted by the
SOX Act, infra note 39, were as follows: (1) “Reform auditor independence standards by prohibiting
auditors from providing any non-audit services to their audit clients;” (2) “Radically reform the oversight of auditors;” (3) “Require enhanced disclosure of director links to companies;” (4) “Toughen the
stock exchanges’ listing standards on board independence and board composition;” (5) “Do not soften
the SEC’s stance on enforcement;” (6) “Restore integrity to the proxy voting system by eliminating
the stock exchanges’‘broker may vote’ rule;” and (7) “Meaningfully update disclosure requirements
for financial and other critical information.”
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002) (codified at 15 USC § 7201
(2002)) [SOX Act].
Ibid, § 409 (1).
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certification of annual and quarterly reports by top executives and a prohibition
against share sales by corporate officers during pension blackouts;41 auditor independence, such as rotating the auditor partner every five years;42 as well as the
addition of stricter criminal penalties for managers responsible for any violations.43
Deakin and Konzelmann called the perspective of the third group “a radically different explanation for Enron’s fall.”44 While this group generally accepted
and approved of the initiatives created by the SOX Act, the underlying belief was
that these reform efforts did not go far enough in addressing the root of the
problem. Deakin and Konzelmann noted, “[f]rom this [third] perspective, the fate
of Enron is less important than the future of the business model which it came to
represent ….”45 The group also believed that “[u]nless the regulatory framework is
adjusted to make this model unattractive, it will only be a matter of time before
the same approach is tried again.”46 The problems of Enron inherently grew from
principles embodied within the shareholder primacy model of the corporation.
Members of the senior management of Enron were given stock options that
motivated short-term stock appreciation, and their unethical practices exemplified
the “dark side” of the shareholder wealth maximization norm.47 Proponents of this
third position felt that the model fostered an environment that created oversized
incentives, which invited corruption. “[G]overnance standards… [had] declined,
particularly those addressed to the numerology of shareholder value,”48 and the
artificial inflation of Enron’s stock was revealed only during the downward cycle of
a cyclical economy. Clearly, some argued, a reliable corporate governance model
should be designed to catch wrongdoing before it causes serious financial damage
to shareholders and other stakeholders; therefore, the multiple scandals in 2001
and 2002 only demonstrated how the existing model did not work.49 Deakin and
Konzelmann shared this stance, stating:
We believe that this third interpretation of events goes to the heart
of the matter…. If we are to take this view seriously, nothing less
than a fundamental rethinking of corporate governance practices
and procedures is required. Above all, corporate governance must
no longer confine its analysis to the relationship between managers,
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boards and shareholders. The narrowness of this focus is a major
contributing factor to the present round of corporate scandals of
which Enron is the most emblematic.50
Other scholars, such as Sarra, identified how the scandals signified a real
need to reassess other models of corporate governance available throughout the
world. When examining governance issues within the global capital markets
shortly following Enron’s bankruptcy, Sarra noted:
[T]he recent failures of large, publicly traded corporations in the
United States cast doubt on claims of the ultimate superiority of
the market-centred system. When this doubt is coupled with the
existence of other forms of corporate governance throughout the
world, the need for closer examination of potential alternatives or
improvements in corporate governance becomes more evident.51
Still others, such as Cary Coglianese and Michael L. Michael, suggested that
real corporate governance reform may only be found through the disentrenchment
and reinvention of cultural norms, stating:
If corporate scandals stem from the same kind of underlying cultural
problems that some insist afflict politics, sports, and even religion,
then the core challenge for public policy will be to find ways to
engender nothing less than a fundamental cultural shift.52
These voices aligned with scholars that had been supporting “counterhegemonic” discourses on the shareholder primacy model for some time.53
However, voices from this third group supporting structural changes to the
shareholder primacy model did not gain much traction on the pathway to reform
after the scandals of 2001 and 2002. They were easily outnumbered by those leading
the second group and the mainstream push for greater regulation of financial
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reporting and auditing practices. The discussion during that period surrounded
the effectiveness of the SOX Act and the alteration of the rules to curtail unwanted
human behaviour within existing governance structures, rather than the possibility
of revamping the dominant corporate form.
C. Ascendancy of Behavioural Approaches
From a law and economics perspective, the scandals marked an interesting period.
It is apparent from Posner’s later writings that he firmly belonged within the
first group of scholars supporting laissez-faire market principles, and not within
the second group calling for stricter market regulations to support the existing
governance model, nor the third group envisioning deep normative and structural
reform. In Posner’s 2007 edition of the Economic Analysis of Law, where he directly
responded to the corporate events of 2001 and 2002, he stated:
[F]raud has long been criminal, and the successful prosecution
of the Enron executives suggests that adequate legal tools were in
place to deal with such conduct before Sarbanes-Oxley…. As for
the receipt by accounting firms of fees for consulting and accounting
services…[i]t should be enough to require the corporation to
disclose to investors the terms of its relations with its auditors,
and leave the investors to penalize a corporation by bidding down
its stock price if they think the auditor has been ‘bought.’54
Other advocates of the Chicago School generally echoed this sentiment.
For example, Gary S. Becker, Nobel laureate and a prominent figure in the
Chicago School, argued that if a fully deregulated energy market had been in
place, “the Enron political scandal would have been largely avoided” since “[t]he
company could not have gamed the system by encouraging politicians to deregulate
as it favored.”55 While conceding that the scandal “indicate[d] the need for stricter
guidelines on accounting and greater Internal Revenue Service,” Becker pointed out
that “stock markets have responded by punishing Enron severely for the company’s
transgressions…” and that “flexible prices and competition are far more effective
ways to improve energy markets than allowing bureaucrats and politicians to
determine the speed and direction of deregulation.”56
Despite the firm stance by leading scholars in the Chicago School, this
controversial period in corporate history provided opportunities for other strands
within law and economics scholarship, particularly behavioural approaches, to
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broaden their audience. Objections to the depiction of human agents as rational
actors within the field of law and economics, and especially the Chicago School,
had frequently been voiced in the past by both its supporters and its critics.57 The
scandals exposed the overwhelming need for greater quantitative and qualitative
research surrounding human behaviour in modern finance, while also providing a
golden opportunity to apply behavioural approaches to pressing legal issues.58
Schools were eagerly adopting behavioural approaches in response to the
Chicago School’s concept of the rational, self-interested actor. Herbert A. Simon’s
notion of “bounded rationality,” being “behavior that is intendedly rational, but
only limitedly so …,”59 and other approaches addressing limitations within human
behaviour60 were increasing in influence.61 Robert Prentice, for example, noted how
the scandals supported his continued attempts “to create more realistic policy
prescriptions than have been derived from the Chicago School law and economics
reasoning that has dominated the interdisciplinary approach to legal analysis
….”62 As well, Donald Langevoort asserted that “[t]he ones with the explaining
to do [following the Enron debacle] are the believers in market efficiency ….”63
He contended that “behavioral finance is somewhat better positioned to test the
real world impact of bias in market prices than research in more opaque economic
settings,”64 and went on to develop a constructive theory of behavioural securities
regulation. It was clear that those pressing for more contextualized critiques to the
mainstream Chicago School of law and economics now had the chance to capitalize
on those corporate events.
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Law and economics scholars that were adopting behavioural approaches
around the time of the Enron scandal held, if anything, beliefs in line with the
second group, which argued for greater transparency and accountability of directors
and managers, and for stricter regulation following the scandals to support the
shareholder primacy model. The work of behavioural law and economics scholars
generally focused on ways in which the law could promote desired human behaviour
within pre-existing structures. The field itself utilizes traditional economic tools
and enhances them by providing a better understanding of human behaviour in a
market-driven environment.While recognizing that there can be new and innovative
prescriptions from these lines of inquiry, following the scandals, behavioural law
and economics scholars tended to focus on economic improvements within the
boundaries of securities regulation and on “prescriptions regarding how to make the
legal system work better;”65 not on challenging the very structures and institutions
in which the law operated.66 Behavioural law and economics served as a useful tool
to expose the flaws within the existing model, but the approach was incapable of
offering a meaningful alternative.
Nevertheless, the growing trend towards of behavioural approaches
signaled a marked change in law and economics analysis. In a 1998 article,
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler noted, “Thirty years from
now we hope that there will be no such thing as behavioral economics. Instead
we hope that economists and economically oriented lawyers will … transform
economics into behavioral economics, and economic analysis of law into one of
its most important branches.”67 Following the scandals, the study of behavioural
effects on economics garnered greater strength and momentum from these
market-immobilizing events. George A. Akerlof, for example, argued in his
Nobel Lecture on December 8, 2001, two months after news of the Enron
scandal broke, that macroeconomics should be behavioural and that John Maynard
Keynes’ General Theory “was the progenitor of the modern behavioral finance view
of asset markets.”68 The following year, the selection of Daniel Kahneman as the
co-recipient of the 2002 Nobel Prize in economic sciences indicated to many
“the ascendancy of behavioral economics.”69
One would think the corporate and accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002
would leave an indelible mark against Hansmann and Kraakman’s claim that the
shareholder primacy model was the final resting place of the corporate form.
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Hansmann himself noted five years after his article with Kraakman that “[t]he most
serious argument against the efficiency claim…is that the standard shareholderoriented model involves too steep a tradeoff between material prosperity and social
order…. It is from this perspective that the end of history claim is weakest.”70 It
was apparent from the scandals that the human limitations of “bounded rationality,
bounded will-power, and bounded self-interest”71 exposed the inherent flaws found
within perceived transparencies and efficiencies in the financial market. Following
those events, many felt a behavioural approach to law and economics offered a
better way of addressing human weaknesses in regulatory design, but the approach
contained few positive prescriptions for the development of an alternative,
competing model. The burden continued to rest on lawmakers’ abilities to
adequately protect stakeholder interests through contractual or regulatory means,
and not on the corporate governance model itself. The scandals were potentially
damaging to the reputation of the shareholder primacy model, but its continued
survival only solidified Hansmann and Kraakman’s argument that the model had
lasting acceptance within US ideological thought.
III. NARRATIVES FROM THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act72
The Banking Act of 1933,73 popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA), had
restricted commercial banks from any involvement in the securities industry,
creating a firewall between commercial banking and investment banking. On
November 12, 1999, then-US President Bill Clinton signed into law the GrammLeach-Bliley Act74 (GLBA), which repealed some of the key elements of the GSA so that
banks could thereafter be affiliated with securities firms.
Then-US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers described the repeal
of the GSA as “updat[ing] the rules that have governed financial services since
the Great Depression and replac[ing] them with a system for the 21st century,”
thereby allowing American banks to “grow larger and better compete on the world
stage.”75 Senator Phil Gramm, the chief sponsor of the GLBA, identified the GSA as a
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“punitive” law that was brought about by fear and popular “demagoguery” from the
Great Depression, and which “forced an artificial separation of the financial sector
of our economy.”76 Other senators also argued that the GSA created “unnecessary
barriers”77 in the economy, and applauded its demise.78
Looking back, the GSA had already been considerably weakened by incremental bank incursions over the line of separation through the 1990s. However, what
is less widely known is how one of the largest pending mergers79 of its time, between
two financial giants, Citicorp Inc. (Citicorp) and Travelers Group Inc. (Travelers),
ultimately dealt the final blow to the Act.The deal between these corporations created
the largest “financial supermarket” in the world, “giving [both institutions] access
to an expanded client base”80—particularly with Travelers promoting its mutual
funds and insurance to Citicorp’s retail customers. The pending $70 billion merger
(totalling over $698 billion in assets)81 to form Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup) was
in violation of certain provisions of the GSA as well as the Bank Holding Company Act
of 195682 because of its resulting combination as a financial services company offering
commercial banking and investment operations. All involved were aware the merger
violated the law, but the potential financial gains were enough for powerful business
executives to go out of their way and lobby politicians to ensure future law would
support it.83
While it is true that the Citicorp-Travelers merger legally closed following
the implementation of the GLBA, it had already been agreed to well in advance
of the introduction of that legislation. When Citicorp and Travelers announced the
signing of their merger on April 6, 1998, Sanford Weill of Travelers, in response
to questions regarding the legal hurdles before the two corporations, stated, “We
are hopeful that over that time the legislation will change…. We have had enough
discussions [with the Federal Reserve Board] to believe this will not be a problem.”84
In the end, the executives of the future Citigroup “basically drafted the [legislation]
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that would govern its behavior.”85 Kenneth H. Thomas, a consultant and lecturer
in finance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, noted that
“Citigroup is not the result of [the GLBA] but the cause of it.”86 Weill had forced the
repeal issue of the GSA. In his induction into the Academy of Achievement, Weill’s
biography outlines the strategic manoeuvres that came with changing the law:
Weill and Citicorp Chairman John S. Reed decided to force the
issue [of repeal]. They went ahead with their plan and secured a
waiver whereby the temporary merger of the companies would be
permitted, pending congressional action. Weill recruited former
President Gerald Ford, a Republican, and former Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin, a Democrat, to serve on the board of the merged
companies and assist them in making their case to Congress.87
The timing by which Robert Rubin entered the picture is of particular
interest. Rubin was still US Treasury Secretary at the signing of the merger, serving
in that capacity from 1995 to 1999.88 As Treasury Secretary, he played a large role
in brokering the passage of the final draft of the GLBA, which allowed Citicorp and
Travelers to legally merge. Following Senate approval of the bill on May 6, 1999,
Rubin resigned as Treasury Secretary. Five months later, he became the Chairman
of the Board at the newly formed Citigroup.89 While recognizing that it was Rubin’s
expertise which made him a contender in a very small group of people who were
under serious consideration to take on these government and private sector roles,
the example is an exposing one. It is erroneous to believe that political actions
are necessarily separated from corporate influence and powerful lobbying efforts,
or that regulators and corporate actors at elite levels are distinctly separate. The
United States Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v Federal Election Commission,
which eliminated the ban on corporate political spending, could magnify this point
in the future.90
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An extensive consolidation in banking occurred following the repeal of the
GSA by the GLBA. Between 1990 and 2005, more than 5,400 mergers occurred
in the US banking industry, involving more than $5.0 trillion in banking assets.91
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. noted that “US and European banks took advantage of the
progressive dismantling of the [GSA] by acquiring dozens of US securities firms …
and large securities firms [in turn] made their own acquisitions.92 The bank merger
wave meant that the proportion of banking assets held by the 10 largest US banks
more than doubled, from 25 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2005. Wall Street
firms also secured bank-like powers by acquiring depository institutions insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), enabling them to offer
FDIC-insured deposits and to make commercial and consumer loans.93 By 2006,
the four largest US securities firms—Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman
Sachs and Lehman Brothers—had effectively become “de facto universal banks” or
shadow banks.94
Many have noted that the problematic mix of the two banking sectors
was self-evident. Andrew Sheng, for example, stated “you cannot mix the
culture of investment banking (where risk taking is key) and commercial
banking (where prudence is vital) under one roof.”95 The repeal of regulatory
firewalls under the GSA invited “massive contagion” between banking industry
sectors.96 Martin Wolf of the Financial Times observed “that financial liberalisation
and financial crises go together like a horse and carriage.”97 Several experts have
pointed to the shadow banking system as the “core of what happened” to cause

91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Arthur E Wilmarth, Jr, “The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis” (2009) 41 Conn L Rev 963 at 977.
Ibid.
Ibid at 977-8.
Ibid at 978.
Andrew Sheng, From Asian to Global Financial Crisis: An Asian Regulator’s View of Unfettered Finance in the
1990s and 2000s (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 401.
Ibid at 326.
Martin Wolf, “This time will never be different,” Financial Times (28 September 2009), online:
Financial Times <http://www.ft.com>. On December 16, 2009, Senators John McCain and
Maria Cantwell proposed legislation to Congress reinstating the GSA or a form of it, under
which large banks “would be forced to return to the business of conventional banking, leaving the task of risktaking or management to others.” Alison Vekshin, “U.S. Senators Propose Reinstating Glass-Steagall Act,” Bloomberg (16 December 2009), online: Bloomberg.com
<http://www.bloomberg.com>. The proposal sparked a renewed debate on whether the repeal
of the GSA led to the current financial crisis. Regardless of one’s stance, reactions on the feasibility of the proposal have been mixed, with some very strong dissents. These dissents reflect
the loaded question of how practical a reconstruction of former legal structures would be once
property has been allowed to disperse and co-mingle to such an extent. The proposed legislation
has not moved forward. See ibid; Alison Vekshin & James Sterngold, “Reviving Glass-Steagall
Means Escalating ‘War’ on Wall Street,” Businessweek (27 December 2009), online: Businessweek.com <http://www.businessweek.com>; Michael Hirsh, “An Odd Post-Crash Couple,”
Newsweek (14 December 2009), online: The Daily Beast.com <http://www.thedailybeast.com/
newsweek>.

206

REVUE DE DROIT D’OTTAWA
43:2

OTTAWA LAW REVIEW
43:2

the crisis.98 The questionable relationship between Citigroup management and its
regulators in the repeal of the GSA is only one of a multitude of factors leading up
to the global financial crisis, but it is a telling one. The reliance of regulation to
protect stakeholder interests under the shareholder primacy model is problematic,
and ignores the realities of disinterested owners (who through computerized
markets are able to own and then sell shares in fractions of a minute, among other
things), the growing phenomenon of shareholder decisions being manipulated by
vote buying through equity derivatives,99 the singularly-focused and well-connected
executives, as well as the regulators whose actions do not show a meaningful regard
for broader stakeholder interests.
B. Originate-to-Distribute Model of Lending100 and Repeal of Anti-Predatory
Lending Legislation
The failure to protect broader stakeholder interests through regulation, a key tenet
within Hansmann and Kraakman’s definition of the shareholder primacy model,
is further evidenced when examining the backstory behind the development
of the originate-to-distribute model of lending (OTDM). An unregulated, overthe-counter (OTC) derivatives market permitted many corporate institutions to
capitalize on inventive methods of generating income—and capitalize they did. The
OTDM allowed financial institutions to reduce their capital charges and transfer
the risks associated with securitized loans to a market hungry to buy them. The
strategy worked as follows: (i) originate consumer mortgage loans; (ii) package
the loans, in tranches, into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs); (iii) create additional OTC derivatives whose values are
derived from the underlying loans; and (iv) distribute the repackaged securities to
investors.101 Most institutions only held onto mortgages long enough to sell them
to investors, which promoted a higher-risk environment for loan production.
In addition to creating a separation between the mortgagor-mortgagee
relationship and its accompanying mortgage risks, originating financial institutions
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sold mortgages immediately to investors and were therefore able to replenish
their funds and issue more loans to generate greater transaction fees. The financial
incentive was so great that it motivated corporations to (i) originate risky loans
without screening borrowers and (ii) avoid post-loan monitoring of the mortgagees’
behaviour because the loans were transferred to investors.102 A potential mortgagee
was previously required to provide documentary evidence of adequate income
and assets to support the repayment of the loan. With time, however, the fierce
competition between lending institutions lessened the requirements to a point
where “No Income, No Asset” (NINA) mortgages were created. In these NINA
mortgages, a potential mortgage borrower would not be required to provide any
evidence of their income or assets to qualify for a loan. Of course, this development
also meant that no information would be verified by the mortgage lender. As put
by one former executive director at the mortgage trading desk of Morgan Stanley,
“We’re setting you up to lie. Something about that transaction feels very wrong …
Unfortunately what happened, we did it because everybody else was doing it.”103
How did the mortgage lending industry get to this point? A well-functioning
shareholder primacy model recognizes that stakeholder interests are exclusively
within the purview of the government, and stakeholder protection must be sought
through contractual or regulatory means. Why were no stiff anti-predatory lending
laws in place to, at the very least, curtail some of the worst corporate behaviours
being exhibited by the industry? The easy answer would be to blame state and federal
legislators for failing to govern effectively. However, powerful lobbying efforts by
corporate institutions, just like those discussed in the preceding narrative, played a
critical role in influencing regulatory inaction. These lobbying efforts prevented the
implementation of regulations that could have contained reckless lending practices.
More troubling, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper has provided empirical
evidence supporting the correlation between lobbying activities by corporate and financial institutions on issues related to mortgage lending and securitization, and significantly riskier mortgage lending strategies by those institutions leading up to the crisis.104
Several subprime lenders and banking trade groups, particularly
Ameriquest Mortgage Company (Ameriquest) but also “Citigroup Inc., Wells
Fargo & Co., Countrywide Financial Corp. and the Mortgage Bankers Association, spent heavily on lobbying and political giving [such as donations and
campaign contributions]… to defeat anti-predatory lending legislation”105 in the

102
103

104

105

Ibid at 974.
Alex Blumberg, “355: The Giant Pool of Money Transcript” (5 May 2008) Interview of Mike Francis on
This American Life, Chicago Public Radio Archives at 11, online: This American Life <http://www.
thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/355/transcript>.
Prachi Mishra, Deniz Igan & Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis,
Working Paper No 09/287 (Washington, DC: IMF Publications, 2009), online: International
Monetary Fund <http://www.imf.org>.
Glenn R Simpson, “Lender Lobbying Blitz Abetted Mortgage Mess,” The Wall Street Journal (31 December 2007) B1.

208

REVUE DE DROIT D’OTTAWA
43:2

OTTAWA LAW REVIEW
43:2

run-up to the crisis. From 2002 through 2006, Ameriquest and its affiliates
donated at least $20.5 million to state and federal political groups.106 Hiring
lobbyist Lisa Andrews as Senior Executive for Government Affairs at Ameriquest
meant the company gained access to several lobbying firms dedicated to influencing
legislation. During her tenure at Ameriquest, Andrews noted that, at her separately
owned Washington public relations firm, Washington Communications Group Inc.,
she had “built a coalition of mortgage brokers, mortgage bankers, appraisers, title
companies, and others involved in home mortgage lending to create a grass-roots
lobbying campaign that produced 7,000 emails and faxes to state policymakers in a
six-week time frame.”107 Andrews’ husband, Wright Andrews, and his governmental
relations firm Butera & Andrews, “collected at least $4 million in fees from the
subprime industry from 2002 through 2006….”108 These efforts to influence the
state laws that governed the industry worked tremendously well. For example,
consider how industry lobbying efforts influenced Georgia’s anti-predatory
legislation. On April 22, 2002, Georgia signed into law the Georgia Fair Lending Act
(GFLA) which became effective on October 1, 2002.109 Among other things, the
GFLA required lenders to be able to prove that a refinancing of any home loan
less than five years old would provide a “tangible net benefit to the borrower.”110
Ameriquest began lobbying the state legislature to remove this provision,
arguing the standard was too vague.111 The company began contributing to Georgia
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politicians112 and the subprime industry mounted a campaign against the rule in
the GFLA.
In October 2002, Ameriquest announced it would stop doing business in
Georgia until the law changed.113 Other lenders also complained about the law,
as did the Federal National Mortgage Association (commonly known as “Fannie
Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (commonly known
as “Freddie Mac”). Both “announced plans to leave the ‘high-cost loan’ market in
Georgia,” with Freddie Mac declaring that it would stop purchasing those loans as of
November 2002 and Fannie Mae as of January 2003.114 Fannie Mae also announced
that it would “conduct additional quality assurance reviews of mortgages secured
by properties in Georgia and [would] require ‘immediate’ repurchase of those loans
determined to be high-cost home loans under the GFLA, or other federal, state or
local laws.”115 Shortly there after, Standard & Poor Corp. (S&P) and Fitch Ratings
(Fitch) announced they would no longer assign credit ratings to many mortgage
securities containing subprime loans from Georgia.116 Both S&P and Fitch believed
that if loans were found to be in violation of the law, the legal risk could carry the
investors, potentially tainting the securities. S&P contended that under the new
law, “liability for predatory lending practices does not stop with the lender guilty
of the predatory practices but transfers to all purchasers of the mortgage, including
purchasers who had no knowledge or role in the predatory lending.”117 Without
credit ratings, such securities would have been virtually unmarketable. The change
raised the possibility that subprime lenders would simply stop making loans in
Georgia. Within months, the Georgia state government passed new amendments
that eliminated the “tangible net benefit”118 requirement opposed by the industry
for nearly all loans.119 The same scenario began to play out in other states, including
112
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New Jersey, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas, whose anti-predatory
lending laws were also rolled back.120 This again is a marked example of how the
shareholder primacy model provides an incomplete story of how non-shareholder
stakeholders can be adequately protected through regulation.
The mass production of subprime mortgage loans by the mortgage lending
industry allowed for the derivative producing machine of the OTDM to operate on
overdrive. Cristie Ford and I have noted that “[b]y 2006, the U.S. housing market
was resting on what some called a system of ‘Ponzi finance’ in which subprime
borrowers kept taking out new loans from equity on their homes to pay off
their existing mortgages on those same homes.”121 In January 2006, Ameriquest
announced a $325 million settlement with state attorneys general, law enforcement
agencies and financial regulators across the US over allegations of predatory lending
practices used to encourage homeowners to refinance mortgages. These allegations
“included misrepresenting and failing to disclose loan terms, charging excessive loan
origination fees, and inflating appraisals to qualify borrowers for loans.”122 The
settlement covered approximately 725,000 loans valued at more than $109 billion
that were made by Ameriquest from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2005.123
In May 2006, Ameriquest announced that it was closing all of its retail offices.
In September 2007, all of its mortgage assets were sold to Citigroup.124
Ameriquest’s eventual fall may support the belief that market regulation
again sufficed. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Ameriquest is only one example
that researchers can point to in hindsight—it is impossible to guess how many
similar actions from corporations have gone unprosecuted to date. Furthermore,
Ameriquest’s demise does not change how lobbying efforts rolled back antipredatory lending laws intended to protect mortgage borrowers. Housing prices
began to decline in mid-2006, and borrowers who bought more real estate than they

120

121
122

123

124

See Muolo & Padilla, supra note 106 at 92; Simpson, supra note 105. The Mortgage Bankers Association website also lists a significant number of news releases issued from groups in the mortgage
lending industry that lobbied against anti-predatory lending laws in several states, online: Mortgage
Bankers Association <http://www.mortgagebankers.org>.
Ford & Liao, supra note 72 at 905.
New York State Office of the Attorney General, Press Release, “Governor Spitzer and Attorney
General Cuomo Announce More Than 13,000 New Yorkers to Receive Settlements in Predatory Lending Case” (24 December 2007), online: New York State Office of the Attorney General
<http://www.oag.state.ny.us>.
State of New York Banking Department, Press Release,“Banking Department Joins Regulators and
Law Enforcement Officials from 48 Other States in Announcing Settlement Agreement with Ameriquest Mortgage Company” (23 January 2006), online: State of New York Banking Department
<http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr060123.htm>. In 2005, Ameriquest’s employees also accused
the company in the press. See Mike Hudson & E Scott Reckard, “Workers Say Lender Ran ‘Boiler
Rooms,” Los Angeles Times (4 February 2005), online: Los Angeles Times <http://www.latimes.com>
(where the authors indicate that critics stated the company “fabricated data, forged documents and
hid fees,” among other things).
Jonathan Stempel, “Ameriquest Closes, Citigroup Buys Mortgage Assets,” Reuters (1 September 2007),
online: Reuters <http://www.reuters.com>. See generally Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
supra note 2.

Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century:

211

A Critical Reassessment of the Shareholder Primacy Model

could afford could not refinance and began defaulting on their loans.The increase
in mortgage defaults and housing foreclosures translated into a sharp decline in the
value of MBSs, CDOs and other bundled securities, and the subprime mortgage
meltdown began.
There have been varied interpretations of how the collapse of the subprime
mortgage market transformed into the broader financial crisis.125 The generally
accepted interpretation of events can briefly be described as follows. In the midst
of the collapse, it was revealed that “too big to fail” institutions had engaged in a
multitude of credit default swaps on those aforementioned MBSs, CDOs and other
bundled securities. These securities were intended to insure investors against what
these institutions believed to be the almost impossible event of default.126 By some
estimates, the collective exposure of institutional investors in mid-2007 exceeded
even that of banks.127 As the crisis continued to unfold, institutional investors in
need of cash began to face a serious liquidity problem, but could not sell the assetbacked securities in their portfolios due to low liquidity levels in the market.128
As a result, they turned to their more liquid holdings of corporate bonds. However,
as Rob Goldsmith noted:
[W]ith several mutual funds and other institutional bond investors
also trying to liquidate their corporate bond holdings, the market
for these, too, was flooded and so prices plunged. As a result, the
cost to companies of obtaining financing by issuing corporate bonds
increased. And, as a result of that, their ability to finance their
operations was crippled, thus spreading the financial crisis to the
real economy.129
At this juncture, it is worth noting an alternative explanation put forth
by Gary B. Gorton on how the subprime mortgage collapse spun into the global
financial crisis. First, Gorton argues that, despite popular belief, the originate-todistribute model of lending was not an instigating factor in the crisis. He states:
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Securitization generally is not the problem currently. It is not the
cause of the crisis. Securitization is an efficient form of financing,
and there is no evidence that there is a systematic agency problem in
its functioning. Rather, the particular form of the design of subprime
mortgages is at root the problem. It was highly sensitive to house
prices, and this sensitivity was passed through to a variety of other
financial structures.130
Gorton believes that the subprime mortgage market, by itself, is too small to
cause a crisis of such magnitude.131 Instead, he compares the collapse of the subprime
market to an E. coli infection in a nation’s beef supply.132 The infection itself is only
a small problem, but an ensuing panic can cause the entire beef industry to collapse.
He contends that the shadow banking system is, “genuine banking and, [as] it turns
out, [is] vulnerable to the same kind of bank runs as in previous U.S. history.”133 A
banking panic occurs when “information insensitive” debt becomes “information
sensitive” due to a shock.134 He argues that the events starting in August 2007 can
best be understood as a wholesale banking panic involving institutions, whereby “firms
[withdrew] from other firms” (unlike the retail banking panics of the 19th and early
20th centuries, where individual depositors withdrew from their banks).135 In the crisis,
falling house prices caused a shock to subprime mortgage values. Large financial firms
“ran” on other financial firms. These large financial firms refused to rollover their sale
and repurchase agreements (repos) or to increase the repo margin (called a “haircut”)
after having grave doubts about the collateral that was being offered: securitiesbased residential mortgages.136 This chain of events forced massive deleveraging
and resulted in an insolvent banking system. Therefore, Gorton contends that the
banking panic was triggered, and not caused, by the collapse of the subprime market.
He admits, “[t]here is much work to be done to understand the ongoing panic, to
formally test my (sometimes admittedly vague) conjectures, and it will be [sic] surely
be some time before researchers can sort through the events.”137 Nevertheless,
Gorton’s research provides an interesting counterpoint to the widely accepted view
that the originate-to-distribute model of lending played a causal role in the crisis.
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C. Developments Arising from the Crisis
The fallout from the crisis led to numerous calls for accountability. The OTC
derivatives market, despite its long existence, was suddenly being referenced in the
media as part of the “dark markets” that “fueled [the] meltdown.”138 “Dark” implied
that the markets were not overseen by a specialized governing authority like the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). When asked who was to blame for the crisis, US Treasury
Secretary Timothy F. Geithner did not place the blame on the mortgage lenders
that had enticed borrowers to accept mortgages beyond their means. He did not
cite greed on the part of the financial institutions or imprudence on the part of
the borrowers. Instead, Secretary Geithner stated, “[t]he financial crisis was caused
by significant gaps in oversight,” and that “[o]ne of the reasons crisis can spread so
rapidly… is the uncertainty people have in judging risk.”139
The above-identified events from the global financial crisis provide a striking
example of how large corporate institutions are almost regarded as beasts that
need to be tamed,140 with regulatory bodies acting as the lion tamers who are at
fault if there is injury to the public. While it is certainly reasonable and necessary
to have a level of expectation rest upon the state to govern corporate behaviour
to the extent that it affects the wider community, the ability of institutions to
disregard the impact their corporate actions have on stakeholders is discouraging.
Furthermore, the level of influence these institutions wield on the very governing
bodies that are supposed to regulate them, through lobbying efforts or otherwise,
is most troubling.
Until the crisis, the OTDM may have been perceived by outsiders as an
acceptable approach that furthered the goal of increasing profit or share value
under the shareholder primacy model. As such, the managers were doing what
they were supposed to do within one set of norms that guided their behaviour.
The government failed by allowing these institutions to get carried away with
their legally permitted (and arguably encouraged) activities. The OTDM, NINA
mortgages, the greed of the mortgage lenders, imprudence of the mortgage
borrowers, incessant lobbying by profit-maximizing corporations and over-hedging
by financial products traders all played an undeniable role in the lead-up to the
crisis. However, most of those involved have not been touched by the law because,
despite “breathtakingly bad behavior” and “real dishonesty” of those involved,141
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no laws were broken.142 The public’s reaction to the crisis was to hold someone
accountable, but the governing authorities were willing to allow both the law
and regulators to shoulder much of the blame. Thus, the crisis has illustrated how
corporate behaviour, influenced by the governance structure in capital markets, can
have the inexplicable result of causing both the public and governmental authorities
to hold market rules accountable for failing to restrict corporate conduct, rather
than blaming the actual corporate conduct itself.
IV. COMPARING PERSPECTIVES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS
Looking back at the three perspectives identified by Deakin and Konzelmann
following the scandals of 2001 and 2002 in Part II(B), one can see how there are
contrasting notes this time around. The position of the first group, which held that
market sanctions alone were effective disciplinary devices, cannot seriously be
considered any longer in the wake of the global financial crisis. In fact, the crisis may
have destroyed the very premise on which this position rests. In an article published
in The New York Times in September of 2009, Paul Krugman criticizes economists
like Olivier Blanchard, now Economic Counsellor (chief economist) at the IMF,
for their declaration of a positive economic state prior to the financial crisis.143
Blanchard wrote an article in 2008 declaring that “the state of macro[economics] is
good,”144 and in a tone reminiscent of Hansmann and Kraakman, argued that “there
has been broad convergence in vision” and methodology for macroeconomics.145
Krugman writes,
The renewed romance with the idealized market was, to be sure,
partly a response to shifting political winds, partly a response to
financial incentives …. Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the
things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations
of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the
problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections

142

143
144
145

On April 16, 2010, the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with fraud for placing financial bets on the prediction that the investments it created and sold through the originate-to-distribute model of lending
would fail. See “Watch This Case,” Editorial, The NewYork Times (17 April 2010) A16, online: The New
York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>; Sewell Chan & Louise Story, “S.E.C. Settling its Complaints with Goldman: $550 Million Penalty in Subprime Case,” The New York Times (16 July 2010)
A1, online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com>. On August 9, 2012, the US Justice
Department stated that it would not bring fraud charges against Goldman Sachs for its role in the
mortgage crisis. See Reed Albergotti & Elizabeth Rappaport, “US Not Seeking Goldman Charges,”
The Wall Street Journal (9 August 2012) C1, online:The Wall Street Journal <http://online.wsj.com>.
Paul Krugman, “How Did Economists Get it So Wrong?” The New York Times (2 September 2009)
MM36, online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com> [Krugman, “Economists”].
Olivier J Blanchard, “The State of Macro” (2009) 1 Annu Rev Econ 209 at 210.
Ibid; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note3.

Corporate Governance Reform for the 21st Century:

215

A Critical Reassessment of the Shareholder Primacy Model

of markets—especially financial markets—that can cause the
economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable
crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe
in regulation.146
Posner, however, has found the large apportionment of blame laid upon
capitalism to be misdirected. In his analysis of the crisis, Posner admits that
“[l]aissez-faire capitalism failed us,”147 but on the question of whether the industry
or the government was more responsible, Posner emphatically believes the
responsibility lies with the government. For Posner, “[the] government allowed
the preconditions of depression to develop and wreak havoc with the economy,”148
and it was the government that provided “responses to the crisis [that] were late,
slow, indecisive, and poorly articulated.”149 Directing a pointed attack at Krugman,
Posner states: “[t]he journalists and politicians, and some who should know better,
like the distinguished macroeconomist Paul Krugman, are engaged in an orgy of
recrimination against Wall Street. They have the wrong target. The responsibility
for building the fences that prevent an economic collapse as a result of risky lending
devolves on the government.”150
Posner has been careful to distance himself from scholars who have applied
behavioural analysis in the autopsy of blame. He has insisted that those on Wall
Street were acting rationally, calling the media coverage of Wall Street greed and
extravagance as “ignorant” and “silly” and rhetorically asking: “What did reporters
think businessmen were like?”151 He insists that blame rests on the lack of regulation
by the government, and not the rational actions conducted by individuals which
ultimately led to the crisis. Posner states:
By having over a period of decades largely deregulated banking, and
credit generally, the government inadvertently allowed the rational
self-interested decisions of private actors—bankers, mortgage
brokers, real estate salesmen, homeowners, and others—to bring
on a financial crisis that the government was unable to prevent from
molting into a depression. A profound failure of the market was
abetted by governmental inaction.152
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Posner’s position is helpful in highlighting many of the problematic arguments generally advanced by avid supporters of the shareholder primacy model.
First, Posner has identified reckless behaviour—which was clearly evidenced in the
OTDM and the NINA mortgages—as rational. Second, as the previous narratives
have shown, Posner has ignored how large institutions are capable of invoking
powerful and unrelenting lobbying efforts on US lawmakers when issues regarding
their regulation and governance are at stake. Lastly, Posner’s position seems to be
an about-face on the Chicago School’s usual free market position regarding the
government’s role in regulating industries, a position it maintained even after the
Enron scandal.153
Posner has admitted that he and the Chicago School erroneously believed
“that markets were perfect, which is to say self-regulating, and that government
intervention in them almost always made things worse.”154 He has berated the three
major CRAs—Moody’s, S&P and Fitch—and argued that they should each lose
their quasi-official status as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
for their role in perpetuating the crisis.155 Surprisingly, Posner suggests, among
other things, that reinstating the GSA is a viable and realistic solution.156 The Chicago
School of law and economics may need to readjust itself to the new political and
economic climate. If it does not readjust, the Chicago School’s influence will weaken
as other fields of study gain greater traction.
Still, Posner’s strong reproach of governmental inaction during the crisis
does not mean he shied away from recognizing that the crisis was also “a failure of
capitalism”157 and the unfettered market. Deakin and Konzelmann’s first position
examined in response to the scandals of 2001 and 2002—being the belief that
laissez-faire market sanctions are sufficient in times of financial turmoil—is now
on tenuous ground. It is easy to call Enron an aberration and leave things as the
status quo. However, the global financial crisis cannot be called an aberration, a
market hiccup or a normal bubble that burst. The US government’s $700 billion
bailout and stimulus package has significantly limited the viability of that argument.
The crisis has thus caused many belonging in the first group, including Posner, to
make a strong shift into the second group that is focused on improving corporate
behaviour through the tightening of securities regulation.
In fear of the crisis causing the “second Great Depression,”158 the US
government first implemented emergency response legislation through the American
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Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008159 and the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008,160 the latter of which authorized the government’s
$700 billion bailout. Following these Acts, President Barack Obama announced his
support of the “Volcker Rule,” named after Paul Volcker, head of the President’s
Economic Recovery Advisory Board and former Chairman of the US Federal
Reserve.TheVolcker Rule specifically prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary
trading that is not undertaken on behalf of its clients, and from owning or investing
in a hedge fund or private equity fund. It also limits the liabilities that the largest
banks can hold.161
Volcker’s appointment has been heartening for many who are seeking more
aggressive ways to reform Wall Street. As part of his argument that banks should
be prevented from taking advantage of governmental safety nets in order to make
speculative investments,Volcker has acknowledged the need for deep, sweeping and
multifaceted structural reform in the financial services industry, while also pointing
to reform measures that may substantially alter the internal governance of financial
institutions.162
Volcker’s participation in governmental reform efforts has led to numerous
changes that have been adopted in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (DFA), which President Obama signed into law on July 21, 2010.163 Its
preamble states that the purposes of the Act are “[t]o promote the financial stability
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts,
[and] to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices.”164 Resonating
with voices from Deakin and Konzelmann’s second group, the legislation puts a
great deal of faith in the watchful eye of regulators to prevent another financial
crisis, “leav[ing] the financial industry largely intact but facing a more powerful
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network of regulators who could impose limits on risky activities.”165 The Act
creates new agencies to police consumer lending, financial products innovations
and trading in the dark markets of complex derivatives. Consumer lending is now
under the purview of a new consumer financial protection bureau,166 while the
SEC is granted authority to broaden the regulation of hedge funds and CRAs.167
Many derivatives are now required to be traded through clearinghouses, and traders
must disclose pricing data to encourage transparency and competition.168 The Act
also increases the regulatory powers of the Federal Reserve; establishes a systemic
risk council to detect potential threats to the overall financial system; and provides
new powers to constrain and even dismantle troubled companies, forcing creditors
and shareholders to bear losses so taxpayers do not end up footing the bill.169
Nevertheless, the Act still “leaves a vast number of details for regulators to work
out,” which some point out is “inevitably setting off another round of battles that
could last for years.”170
Prior to the final approval of the bill, a flurry of lobbying efforts and dealmaking allowed several industries to escape many of the provisions found in the
DFA. Intense lobbying efforts translated into automobile dealers receiving an
exemption from oversight by the new consumer bureau, despite being “among
the biggest originators of consumer credit in America….”171 Dealers argued that
the rules would place unnecessary restrictions on their financing businesses. The
Obama administration opposed such an exemption, but gave in to these demands
during negotiations. Most significantly, industry lobbyists made a concerted effort
to push for a series of exemptions to the Volcker Rule that would allow banks to
continue to operate businesses as investment funds that hold only client funds.172
Asset management and insurance companies pushed for a carve-out to exclude them
from the Act outright, succeeding in large part.173 As well, Senator Scott Brown,
the Republican representative from Massachusetts, pushed for an exemption from
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the Volcker Rule that would allow banks to continue to invest in hedge funds and
private equity firms, which ultimately succeeded.174 It was reported that Brown
was largely focused on assisting the corporate interests of Boston-based money
management giants like Fidelity Investments and State Street Corporation, but the
exemption also allows many of the financial institutions at the core of the crisis to
keep any assets or subsidiaries that would have violated such regulations.175
Volcker himself endorsed the final version of the DFA, “but unenthusiastically.”176 He believes that banks still have “too much wiggle room to repeat the
behavior that threw the nation into crisis in the first place.”177 Both critics and
endorsers alike have also contended that the Volcker Rule has been weakened to
the point where it will likely be ineffective in its application.178 Many have pointed
out that the DFA leaves so much decision-making in the hands of regulators that it
could lead to a field day for lobbyists in the financial industry.179
Unlike what was seen following the corporate and accounting scandals
of 2001 and 2002, the US government has not capitalized on efforts to improve
governance within the institutions that brought about the crisis. Other than
allowing shareholders to have an advisory vote on executive compensation—which
conceptually aligns with the principles behind the shareholder primacy model—
there are no corporate governance reform measures addressed in this legislation,
let alone any that challenge the present-day model. There are no regulations set
to tighten internal governance, make boards more competent and accountable
for complex risk-taking activity, improve internal risk management or address
stakeholder interests in corporate decision-making. Any considerations regarding
other structural corporate governance reform, as expressed in Deakin and
Konzelmann’s third group, do not appear in the legislation created in reaction to
the crisis. President Obama indirectly said this himself, stating that “unless your
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business model depends on bilking people, there is little to fear from these new
rules.”180
Indeed, the corporate behaviour of these institutions may prove President
Obama’s words to be true. Wall Street firms have aggressively sought ways to get
around restrictions in the DFA. For example, according to media reports, “UBS
prepared a 20-page ‘action plan’ outlining various options [to curtail the effects
of the Act], while senior managers at Goldman Sachs had preliminary discussions
on eventually dropping its status as a federally insured bank, allowing it to escape
several of the most stringent provisions in the new law.”181 It was also reported that
“Wall Street trading floors are buzzing about creative ways to possibly limit the
impact” of the Volcker Rule, with unidentified traders informing reporters that “it
will be tricky for regulators to define what [legally] constitutes a proprietary trade
as opposed to a reasonable hedge against looming risks. Therefore, banks might still
be able to make big bets by simply classifying them differently.”182 Frank Partnoy
commented: “Wall Street has always been very skilled at getting around rules,
and this law will be no exception… Once you open up the door just a crack,
Wall Street shoves the door open and runs right through it.”183 Volcker also stated
that “[p]eople are nervous about the long-term outlook, and they should be.”184
It seems that US culture is at least passively settled with the shareholder
primacy model as it currently exists. Governments are responsible for adjusting
legal rules to restrain certain incentives that guide the existing model. If corporate
conduct causes negative ramifications to society without appropriate regulation to
address it, the solution is to create reactionary law to prevent such conduct from
recurring in the future. It suggests that a cyclical pattern of disaster and reactionary
lawmaking will always accompany the financial markets if the shareholder primacy
model is here to stay. This pattern is particularly concerning as innovative financial
products are produced with a level of speed and complexity that has regulators
struggling to keep up. After considering the regulatory overhaul plan when it was
initially proposed by the Obama administration, even before it was whittled down by
lobbying groups and partisan politics, Krugman already saw that it was not enough,
stating that “[i]t seems all too likely that the industry will soon go back to playing
the same games that got us into this mess in the first place.”185 If lasting change on
a broader scale is expected, other pathways to reform—namely, those resonating
from Deakin and Konzelmann’s third group—need to be considered.
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V. RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM
A. Borrowing Old and New Institutional Approaches
The focal point of this article is to shed new light onto old arguments that critique
the shareholder primacy model, using modern financial calamities as the compelling
backdrop. In the pursuit of an alternative corporate governance model, there may be
value in reconsidering the issue by borrowing elements from both institutional law
and economics and new institutional economics (NIE). This section first provides
very brief descriptions of elements within the two fields that may assist as a starting
point for reforming the shareholder primacy model, and then offers examples of
structural reform in the business world.
Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema state that “[f]rom the Institutional
perspective, law is fundamentally a matter of rights creation and re-creation.”186
The government is seen as playing a central and inevitable role within the process
because “[r]ights are whatever interests government protects vis-à-vis other
interests when there is a conflict.”187 Significance rests on the issue of whose rights
are enabled through law, as well as on the subsequent structures that perpetuate
those rights. Thus, “terms such as regulation, deregulation, and government intervention [are] misleading,” as the critical issue “turns on whose interests government
allows to be realized and who is able to use government for what ends.”188
The recognition of governmental rights creation also means institutional
scholars challenge their neoclassical counterparts on the notion of an ultimate
efficient result, arguing that an outcome is efficient only with regard to an assumed
initial structure of rights.189 The way in which a structure is formed “will give rise to
a particular set of prices, costs, outputs, and the like, and thus to a particular efficient
allocation of resources.”190 In this sense, institutional scholars strongly contend that
“[t]here is no independent test by which the law’s solution can be said to be the
efficient solution.”191 A structural change means a corresponding modification to
what is regarded as most efficient. As Warren J. Samuels asserts, “[t]o argue that
wealth maximization [or any other efficiency criterion] can determine rights serves
only to mask a choice of which interests to protect as rights. Legal decisions or
changes can be said to be efficient only from the point of view of the party whose
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interests are given effect ….”192 Because the government and institutional structures
are seen as primary sources through which control or power is effectuated, the main
focus of institutional scholars is to understand how the governmental allocation
of rights within such institutions shapes the performance of the economic system
over time.193
The recognition of alternative efficient solutions, as well as the contingent
nature of any “efficient” result on a presumed rights structure and definition of
output, exposes the inherent normative elements embodied within the shareholder primacy model. The term “shareholder primacy” itself leaves little doubt
as to which corporate actor is perceived as having the greatest legal and normative
rights. Having share value as the principle measure of interest amplifies how “[t]he
determination of a particular efficient solution involves a normative and selective
choice as to whose interests will be accommodated, who will realize gains, and
who will realize losses.”194 Alternative legal models that allocate rights differently,
or include other methods of calculating output, will invariably point to different
efficient outcomes.
NIE is also valuable to consider as it “consists of answering new questions,
why economic institutions emerged the way they did and not otherwise; it merges
into economic history, but brings sharper [microanalytic] … reasoning to bear
than had been customary.”195 NIE asserts, among other things, that “institutions
do matter” and “the determinants of institutions are susceptible to analysis by the
tools of economic theory.”196 There are several elements within NIE that overlap
with behavioural approaches; many NIE scholars reject formal rational behaviour,
and advocate models based on Simon’s bounded rationality,197 among others.
The institutional component of this field may provide that crucial missing link
between neoclassical and behavioural approaches that is needed for a structural
reform of the existing governance model. NIE may help to answer the question,
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“why [do] less than optimal arrangements persist over time[?]”198 And more
importantly, how can these suboptimal arrangements be changed?
Walter W. Powell has argued that “the full power of the institutional
perspective has yet to be realized due in part to ambiguities in some of the initial
contributions to this line of work and to the fact that a somewhat stylized version of
institutional theory—a restricted institutionalism—has thus far been explicated.”199
NIE’s emphasis on environmental factors, power imbalances, political influences
and economic arrangements are only some themes that may add considerable value
when rethinking corporate governance reform. Admittedly, there is much more
still to be developed in NIE; within the field there are several competing voices and
ideas. But as Oliver Williamson put it, “NIE is informative and should be included
as part of the reform calculus.”200
There is friction within the two fields—institutional law and economics
had its glory days in the 1920s and 1930s201 but continues to resonate in law and
economics scholarship, whereas NIE (which was coined by Oliver Williamson in
the 1970s) has been gaining popularity in academic circles and claims have been
made that “its best days lie ahead.”202 NIE seeks to differentiate itself from old
institutional theory and offers vibrant discussions to present-day issues. This
tension may prove useful to corporate governance reformists; elements from both
approaches help to clarify and broaden the scope of the issues that are necessary to
consider when establishing a theoretical basis for reform.The following sections
examine reform efforts that are taking place to alter the current shareholder
primacy model of the American business world.
B. “Other Constituency” Statutes and the B Corporation
Consideration of stakeholder interests has generally been allowed under several
US state laws since as far back as the 1980s, when the takeover boom saw several
states implement “other constituency” (also known as “nonshareholder constituency”203 or “corporate constituency”204) legislation expressly permitting (and in
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at least one state, requiring205) directors to consider stakeholders in their decisionmaking.206 Over 40 states have implemented such legislation.207
B Lab is a Philadelphia-based non-profit organization that has capitalized on the other constituency statutes. The self-imposed and privately regulated
B Corporation rating system and certification represents an attempt to establish a
new form of socially-minded corporation “which harnesses the power of private
enterprise to create public benefit.”208 The B Corporation uses available state
laws to form its base. A company must already be incorporated in a state with an
other constituency statute, or must re-incorporate in a jurisdiction with such a
statute in order to become a B Corporation.209 The B Corporation is attempting
to “use the power of business to solve social and environmental problems.”210
At the time of this article, there are 635 US B Corporations, with the number
steadily increasing.211
In order to become a B Corporation, a company is first required to take a
B Impact Assessment which asks socially-minded questions relating to accountability, employees, consumers, community and the environment.212 B Lab’s governancerelated questions strongly imply support for greater stakeholder-based and
board-controlled management. A corporation is certified once an acceptable
score is obtained under their Rating System, and the company is required to
submit supporting documents for a portion of the answers.213 B Lab relies on this
certification and a separate auditing system to ensure B Corporations are pursuing
and achieving their social mandates. Within an allotted time following certification, B Corporations are also required to amend their articles of incorporation
to permit directors to consider more than just shareholder interests when carrying
out their duties.214
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It is important to include stakeholder interests in directorial decisionmaking during potential change of control scenarios, and explicitly indicate that
directors may select an offer with a lower share price based on stakeholder interests
in order to carve out any implications arising from the landmark decision in Revlon,
Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc215 (Revlon). In the case, the Supreme Court of
Delaware held that directors owe a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value in
takeover contexts, regardless of nonshareholder interests. The Revlon decision is
generally regarded as one of the leading judicial precedent in support of the shareholder primacy model, and B Lab has elected to address the matter head-on. To
date, there have been no legal challenges to any of B Lab’s suggested amendments
to company articles.
While the numbers are impressive given the grassroots nature of this
phenomenon, the number of B Corporations is infinitesimally small when compared
to the amount of corporations existing in the United States, which, according to
the US Census Bureau, totals over 27 million businesses.216 Dana Brakman Reiser
cautions that “it remains to be seen whether this system will have strong teeth.”217
She comments that:
[T]he B corporation form realistically offers only moral, rather
than legal, assurances to non-shareholder constituencies and social
interests. Stakeholders have no structural rights in governance, and
no additional parties are granted standing to litigate. B corporation
directors are empowered to act in the interests of other constituencies; whether they do so will depend on their own desires or
feelings of moral obligation.218
Given that B Lab is a private organization, it does not have the authority to
manipulate existing legal structures. Nevertheless, the B Impact Assessment goes to
the core of the business purpose and mission, and addresses stakeholder interests
and sustainability concerns. Corporations may choose to become B Corporations
so they can align themselves with like-minded companies, and the B Corporation
branding may “draw in directors committed to a blended mission and investors
willing to enforce it.”219 It could one day be a certification popularly recognizable
to consumers.
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B Corporation advocates have been involved in encouraging state governments, such as those in Maryland and Vermont (which will be examined in the next
section), to change their corporate laws to create the legal infrastructure necessary for business/mission hybrid corporations. As a strategic movement that has
tapped on the shoulders of business leaders and politicians for support, the B Corporation may become meaningful in changing the way corporations are perceived to
do business.
C. State Benefit Corporations
In 2010, the states of Maryland and Vermont each passed “benefit corporation”
legislation, facilitating new corporate structures designed to create both social
benefits and shareholder value.220 Maryland’s benefit corporation laws took effect on
October 1, 2010221 and Vermont’s on July 11, 2011.222 Several states have followed
suit.223 There are no tax incentives attributed with these laws.
The laws passed in Maryland and Vermont both state that the purpose
of a benefit corporation is to create a general public benefit, which is defined as
“a material positive impact on society and the environment, as measured by a thirdparty standard, through activities that promote [some] combination of specific
public benefits.224 A corporation seeking benefit corporation status in either state
must include or make a clear and prominent statement in its articles that it is a
benefit corporation.”225 Unlike B Lab’s certification, there are no specific criteria to
qualify as a Maryland or Vermont benefit corporation so long as proper company
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wording. See Maryland Act, supra note 221, § 5-6C-01(e).
Ibid, § 5-6C-03, § 5-6C-05; Vermont Act, supra note 222 at § 21.05. If a corporation elects to withdraw
from its benefit corporation status, it must obtain two-thirds shareholder approval to amend its
articles and delete the benefit corporation statement. The Vermont Act requires a statement from the
board to explain the reasons why status is being terminated and the effect such termination will
have on its shareholders. Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.07(1).
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approvals have been met. Both states refer to their existing state corporate laws to
fill any holes in the benefit corporation laws.
A significant aspect of the benefit corporation laws is the codification of
stakeholder interests in directorial decision-making. Both Maryland and Vermont outline
factors to be considered by a director when determining what is in the best interests of
the benefit corporation, which in traditional corporate law and practice has referred
only to shareholder value. In Maryland, benefit corporation legislation stipulates that
a director is required to “consider the effects of any action or decision not to act on:”
(1) the stockholders of the benefit corporation;
(2) the employees and workforce of the benefit corporation and
the subsidiaries and suppliers of the benefit corporation;
(3) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general or
specific public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation;
(4) community and societal considerations, including those of
any community in which offices or facilities of the benefit
corporation or the subsidiaries or suppliers of the benefit
corporation are located; and
(5) the local and global environment.226
Vermont has an additional sixth factor, encompassing “the long-term
and short-term interests of the benefit corporation, including the possibility that
those interests may be best served by the continued independence of the benefit
corporation.”227 In contrast to the standard articulated in Revlon, this addition provides
substantially the same protection as a similar provision offered by the B Corporation
model by relieving directors of the duties to maximize shareholder value in a takeover
situation. The explicit inclusion may offer some symbolic vindication for the state of
Vermont, home of the socially-minded ice cream business, Ben & Jerry’s Homemade,
Inc. (popularly known as Ben & Jerry’s), whose board in 2000 had multiple offers
to purchase the company but had no choice but to sell to the highest offer or risk a
shareholder lawsuit.The much-publicized takeover by the British-Dutch conglomerate
Unilever hit a nerve for many inVermont, and the social enterprise sector in general.228
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Maryland Act, supra note 221, § 5-6C-07(a)(1). Vermont has similar provisions with some de minimis
differences in wording. See Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.09(a).
Ibid, § 21.09(a)(1)(F).
Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Press Release, “Ben & Jerry’s and Unilever to Join Forces” (12 April
2000), online: Ben & Jerry’s <http://www.lickglobalwarming.org/company/media-center/press/
archives.cfm>. The much publicized takeover of Ben & Jerry’s Homemade by Unilever is a frequent
bitter example cited by social entrepreneurs. See e.g. Dave Gram, “States Move to Let Firms Pursue
Social Mission,” The Seattle Times (11 April 2010). But see Anthony Page & Robert A Katz, “Freezing
Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon” (2010) 35 Vt L Rev 211
(which argues that Ben & Jerry’s had strict anti-takeover defenses that their board declined to test,
and that negative reactions to the sale of social enterprises may be misguided as such sales may create
more opportunities for social enterprises to do good work).
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In Maryland, the director has no duty (fiduciary or otherwise) to a person
who is a general public beneficiary of the benefit corporation. Vermont, however,
has actually gone a step further in expanding the definition of fiduciary duties for
their directors.229 Vermont directors have fiduciary duties only to those persons
entitled to bring about enforcement proceedings against the benefit corporation,
who have specifically been identified as:
(1) a shareholder that would otherwise be entitled to commence
or maintain a proceeding in the right of the benefit corporation
on any basis;
(2) a director of the corporation;
(3) a person or group of persons that owns beneficially or of
record 10 percent or more of the equity interests in an entity
of which the benefit corporation is a subsidiary; or
(4) such other persons as may be specified in the articles of
incorporation of the benefit corporation.230
A benefit enforcement proceeding means a claim or action against a
director or officer for failing to pursue the public benefit purpose set forth in its
articles, or for violating any duty in the statute. While the expansion may seem
slight, it is important. Shareholders, and shareholders of any parent company,
can bring proceedings against the benefit corporation for violating the broader,
codified stakeholder interests. Furthermore, a benefit corporation also has the
freedom to specifically include any other persons with rights to bring proceedings
in their articles.231
Both Maryland and Vermont require benefit corporations to be responsible
for creating an annual benefit report, with Vermont requiring board approval prior
to the report being sent out to shareholders.232 The report in both states is required
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Vermont Act, supra note 222 at § 21.09(e).
Ibid at § 21.13(b).
Vermont’s expansion of duties thus has required setting out proper parameters of the directors’ duties.
Directors are not required to give priority to the interest of any particular person or group over the
interests of any other person or group unless the benefit corporation has stated its intention of giving
priority in its articles. See Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.09(a)(3). Directors are also not subject to
a different or higher standard of care when decisions may affect the control of the benefit corporation,
ibid, § 21.09(a)(4). As well, a director is not liable for the failure of a benefit corporation to create
general or specific public benefit. In both states, directors have the same immunity from liability as
directors of those corporations generally.
Maryland Act, supra note 221, § 5-6C-08(a); Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.14(a).Vermont has also
created the requirement for one member of the board of directors to be designated as a benefit
director. The benefit director is required to prepare an annual statement detailing whether, in the
opinion of the director, the company acted in accordance with its benefit purpose in all material
respects during the period covered by the report. If the benefit director believes the corporation or its
directors or officers failed in its mission, then the statement should include a description of the ways
in which they failed to so act. See ibid, § 21.10.
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to include: (1) a description of how the benefit corporation pursued a public benefit
during the year and the extent to which the public benefit was created; (2) any
circumstances that hindered the creation of the public benefit; and (3) an assessment
of the societal and environmental performance of the benefit corporation, prepared
in accordance with a third-party standard.233 Vermont also requires the inclusion of
the amount of compensation paid to each director and the name of each shareholder
owning five percent or more of the shares.234 These additions add a heightened level
of transparency and accountability that echoes some of the disclosure requirements
of public companies.235
The development of these benefit corporation laws promotes a more
stakeholder-based model with supporting infrastructure to encourage an active
level of social responsibility. In combination with the B Corporation certification,
which provides a normative component through its Rating System, a potential
solution has been created to combat negative corporate behaviour that may be
damaging to broader community, environmental and other stakeholder interests.
D. Way Forward
State-led initiatives that attempt to reform the shareholder primacy model are a
step in the right direction. It is important to realize, however, that state-led reform
is vulnerable to federal legislative authority. This is despite the “internal affairs”
doctrine, which has been articulated in federal decisions as implying that states
hold the power “to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the
rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares.”236 Mark J. Roe has detailed how
the federal government has frequently breached the doctrine separating state and
federal powers.237 He notes how this federal encroachment has been done formally,
such as under the SOX Act and related initiatives that affect board structure and
authority, and “informally when federal authorities, under the guise of regulating
external corporate action—say, disclosure to securities markets—effectively
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Vermont has also required a statement of the specific goals or outcomes, and actions that can be taken
to attain them while improving its social and environmental performance. See Vermont Act, supra note
222, § 21.14(a)(1)(D). See also supra note 224 (for more on the third-party standard).
Ibid at § 21.14(a)(4)-(7).
This annual benefit report is to be delivered to each shareholder within 120 days following the end
of the benefit corporation’s fiscal year. See Vermont Act, supra note 222, § 21.14(b) (which states that
Vermont also allows delivery to be at the same time that the benefit corporation delivers any other
annual report to its shareholders). Vermont’s legislation also states that, after reasonable opportunity
for review, the shareholders of the benefit corporation must either approve or reject the annual
benefit report by majority vote at the annual meeting of shareholders or at a special meeting held for
that purpose. If the benefit corporation has a public website, the benefit corporation is required to
post its most recent benefit report on the public portion of its website. See ibid, § 21.14(d). See also
Maryland Act, supra note 221, § 5-6C-08(b), (c).
CTS Corporation v Dynamics Corporation of America, 481 US 69, 107 S ct 1637 at 1650, 95 L Ed (2d) 67
(1987).
Mark J Roe, “Delaware’s Competition” (2003) 117:2 Harv L Rev 588.

REVUE DE DROIT D’OTTAWA

230

43:2

OTTAWA LAW REVIEW
43:2

assume control over the underlying governance structure of the corporation ….”238
Reform at the state level is compelling, but in order to permanently recalibrate
existing power structures, there must be agreement, or at least passive acceptance,
at the federal level. As Roe put it, “[w]hat remains with the states is the corporate
law that the federal players tolerate, and what gets reversed is that which they do
not.”239 Therefore, when considering alternative approaches, multifaceted reform
efforts at both the state and federal level may be required to reconfigure efficiency
within corporate structures, as “[t]he structure of corporate law [is inevitably] a
mixed federal-state one….”240
Critiques by old and new institutional scholars of the Chicago School
approach are effective in deconstructing the efficiency premises on which the
shareholder primacy model stands. Through the neoclassical law and economics
lens, “singular solutions” are given to issues which “reflect only one particular set
of value premises and one particular conception of the facts, benefits, and costs
at issue …,” whereas institutional approaches “by recognizing the multiplicity
of potential solutions and underlying value premises, [attempt] to flesh out the
alternative possibilities that are open to society in the ongoing social construction
and reconstruction of legal-economic reality.”241 Institutional and new institutional
critiques draw attention to the prospect of alternative structures in which corporations can thrive—structures that do not require the concept of (and, indeed,
desire for) efficiency to be thrown out. Instead, efficiency can be normatively
reconceptualized to move beyond the narrowness of increasing share value, and
broadened into the social context in which corporations clearly hold formidable
power and influence.
Workable solutions, and their accompanying measures of achievement,
continue to be a source of contention for those in the field of corporate law. But
considering alternative approaches reawakens oneself to the possibilities that are
available. Broader reform efforts should be empowered by new corporate structures
created by state governments that allow for the dual corporate mission of creating
profit and social benefit. There is presently the opportunity to reassess long-held
beliefs in corporate law; indeed, reconsidering the existing corporate governance
model may never be as timely as now.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article provides a contemporary macro-level analysis on the longstanding
debate for and against shareholder primacy. It identifies and organizes key scholarly
perspectives within the debate and tracks their evolution alongside the volatile
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Ibid at 644.
Ibid at 644-45.
Mercuro & Medema, supra note 12 at 240.
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financial environment that has defined the world’s entrance into the 21st century.
Topical narratives from within the global financial crisis illustrate how reform efforts
in the wake of the crisis have been too limited in scope. Time and again we have
seen how large public institutions, while operating within the confines of the law,
focus on profit maximization and increasing share value. Then, following calamitous
events, important figures scrutinize what went wrong and reform efforts take
place.242 Reform efforts targeted at the financial market level are indeed necessary,
but there is a disservice in classifying the crisis as a one-off event resulting from
specific failures in financial regulation, since legislative changes become limited to
addressing only those concerns. This article draws upon the financial crisis as an
example of an ongoing dysfunction in the high-level governance model of corporate
and financial institutions. The legal and ideological support of the shareholder
primacy model of governance has laid the groundwork for corporate behaviour
that heavily influences regulatory inaction and perpetuates the likelihood of
future crises.
Across the Atlantic, there have been indications that European regulators
are aware that their existing corporate governance model will need to be reformed.
A green paper produced by the European Commission (EC) outlining several
governance initiatives states: “[t]he financial crisis has shown that confidence in
the model of the shareholder-owner who contributes to the company’s long-term
viability has been severely shaken, to say the least.”243 As a direct result of the crisis,
the EC announced the launch of a broader review of corporate governance within
publicly listed companies in general.244 In the US, however, negligible governance
reform measures found within the financial regulatory overhaul mean that very
little will change in the way US corporate and financial institutions involved in
the crisis will ultimately govern themselves.The US government has placed a high
priority on modifying securities regulation to curtail specific market behavior
without any changes to address the flaws within the existing governance model
itself. This is despite evidence that governance structures designed to prevent events
such as the mortgage meltdown have not only failed, but have incentivized the
obstruction of efficient regulation.
Governance reform operates on two levels.The first level of reform attempts
to make the actors in an existing model more accountable to the roles they are
supposed to play in that model. The other level reconsiders the very model itself.
It asks, what are the legal principles that we want to guide our corporate laws?
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See Uchitelle, “Loud and Clear,” supra note 176 (where Paul Volcker, sharing this view, was quoted
saying, “There is a certain circularity in all this business …. You have a crisis, followed by some kind
of reform, for better or worse, and things go well for a while, and then you have another crisis”).
European Commission, Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies
(Brussels: European Commission, June 2010) at 8, online: European Commission, Green Papers
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2010_284_en.pdf>.
Ibid at 9-19.
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After all, the devastating financial effects from the crisis not only remind us that
humans and structures are fallible, but they also signify that something is seriously
amiss with the perceived efficiencies embodied in the dominant corporate model.
The model accepted as the norm has justified selfish human behavior, while ignoring
the broader community that corporations inevitably impact.This article provides a
starting point to reconfigure the conversation. It points to alternative approaches,
and provides examples where corporate structures are being manipulated in state
laws to encompass broader stakeholder interests in corporate decision-making.
These are steps in the right direction. Corporate governance reform needs to be
made a part of any sweeping overhaul of the financial system, which moves beyond
reinforcing the shareholder primacy model. As we move forward in the 21st century,
it is time to rethink the governance design of the modern corporate institution.

